Geoengineering : ocean iron fertilisation and the law of the sea by Radcliffe, Saadi
SAADI RADCLIFFE 
 
 
 
 
GEOENGINEERING: OCEAN IRON FERTILISATION 
AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 
 
 
 
LLM RESEARCH PAPER 
LAWS 528: LAW OF THE SEA 
 
 
 
FACULTY OF LAW 
 
2014 
  
 2 
 
Table of Contents 
 
I INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 5 
II PROBLEM DOMAIN DESCRIPTION AND CONTEXT – CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND GEOENGINEERING ...................................................................... 7 
A The Science of Climate Change and its Effects ......................................................... 7 
B What is Geoengineering and why is it Considered? ............................................... 11 
1 Operation Popeye and the Environmental Modification Treaty of 
1976  ...................................................................................................................... 14 
2 Carbon Dioxide Removal ........................................................................... 16 
3 Solar Radiation Management .................................................................... 17 
C Ocean Iron Fertilisation ............................................................................................ 18 
1 The Potential Benefits of Ocean Iron Fertilisation .................................. 18 
2 The Potential Harms of Ocean Iron Fertilisation .................................... 19 
D Social and Ethical Implications and the Moral Hazard of Geoengineering ......... 20 
III THE LAW OF THE SEA AND OCEAN IRON FERTILISATION – THE 
CURRENT REGULATORY REGIME, EVOLUTION AND ANALYSIS ......... 21 
A UNCLOS ..................................................................................................................... 21 
B The 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter and the 1996 Protocol to the 1972 Convention on the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter .................. 27 
1 The Introduction of Ocean Iron Fertilisation to the Scientific Group 
and Consultative Meeting of the Parties under the London Convention .............. 36 
2 The 2007 “Statement of Concern” ............................................................ 39 
C The 2008 and 2010 Resolutions ................................................................................. 41 
1 Hard Law and Soft Law – the Relevance of the 2008 and 2010 
Resolutions .................................................................................................................. 44 
D The Precautionary Principle and the Convention on Biological Diversity ........... 48 
E Conclusion on Ocean Iron Fertilisation under the Current Law .......................... 50 
IV EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LAW AT REGULATING OCEAN IRON 
FERTILISATION – CONTEMPORARY EXAMPLES ........................................ 51 
A The LOHAFEX Experiment ..................................................................................... 51 
B The Haida Salmon Restoration Corporation Case ................................................. 52 
 3 
 
V MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN THE LAW ........................................................ 56 
A Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures ............................................. 56 
B Option Proposed by Australia and New Zealand .................................................... 57 
C Strengthening Domestic Law .................................................................................... 58 
D Economic Considerations .......................................................................................... 59 
VI CONCLUSION........................................................................................................... 59 
VII BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................... 61 
 
 4 
 
Abstract 
Climate change mitigation is one the greatest challenges facing humankind. Recent 
attempts at reducing carbon emissions have stalled. Various proposals have been made 
that aim to reduce the levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide through geoengineering. One 
such technique is ocean iron fertilisation. This paper examines the current state of 
international law surrounding geoengineering practices involving the sea, with a 
predominant focus on ocean iron fertilisation, to evaluate the law’s appropriateness and 
effectiveness at regulating this conduct. This paper concludes that the current law lacks 
certainty and clarity. It proposes that the law would be more effective through a legally 
binding amendment to the London Convention and Protocol, stronger domestic legislation 
and the removal of economic incentives. 
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I Introduction 
 
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the world’s oceans. Modern science tells us that 
life first began in the oceans.1 It is suggested that hydrothermal vents deep beneath the 
surface provided the environment for the formation of amino acids, the precursors to 
carbon-based life forms.2 The first land animals crawled from this primordial soup while 
millions of years later, others re-entered the sea to become the cetaceans that are present 
today.3 Humankind’s development has been reliant on the sea, most notably as an important 
source of food. The sea is a vital source of protein for millions of people around the world. 
The oceans also are the main conduit for commerce, the overwhelming majority of the 
world’s trade is made possible through transportation of goods across the seas. 
 
The aforementioned uses are well-known. People eat fish and rely on goods transported 
from overseas markets. In short they have a direct connection to the sea in these respects. 
However the ocean fulfils another crucial role which is vital to the regulation of the Earth’s 
life sustaining processes. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in its 
2013 report, has observed that “the ocean influences climate by storing and transporting 
large amounts of heat, freshwater, and carbon, and by exchanging these properties with the 
atmosphere.”4 Oceans naturally play a large role in the planet’s climate and temperature 
regulation, oxygen generation and carbon dioxide absorption processes. The IPCC reports 
that approximately 93% of the excess heat energy produced and stored by the Earth over 
the last 50 years is contained in the ocean.5  
  
1 Gunther Wachtershauser “Evolution of the first metabolic cycles” (1990) 87 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 
200.  
2 At 200. 
3 See for example Donald R. Prothero and Scott E. Foss The Evolution of Artiodactyls (The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, 2007). 
4 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change “Climate Change 2013: The Physical Basis. Contribution of 
Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Panel on Climate 
Change” (2013) Report, at 260. [IPCC AR5 Report WG1]. 
5 At 260. 
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Few would disagree that the world’s reliance on fossil fuels as a driver of economic growth 
and prosperity has meant that anthropogenic climate change has become one of the largest 
issues facing humankind today. Various proposals aimed at addressing climate change 
through geoengineering have been put forward with perhaps the most contentious being 
ocean fertilisation. Ocean fertilisation attempts to modify the environment through the 
addition of matter such as iron into the sea. The iron compounds are designed to create or 
stimulate phytoplankton blooms. The introduction occurs in High Nutrient Low 
Chlorophyll (HNLC) regions where it is theorised that the increase in phytoplankton will 
remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere through the process of photosynthesis.6 Most 
of the HNLC regions are on the high seas, in areas beyond national jurisdiction. It is 
unsurprising then that ocean fertilisation involves the intersection of various bodies of law 
such as the law of the sea and climate change or environmental law. The main international 
instruments applicable are the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea7 
(“UNCLOS”), the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter8 (“London Convention”/”The Convention”) and the 1996 
Protocol to the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter9 (“London Protocol”/”The Protocol”). However the technological 
advances in the area of geoengineering post-date the creation of these instruments and their 
applicability and efficacy as a regulatory regime may be questioned. 
 
This paper examines the current state of international law surrounding geoengineering 
practices involving the sea, with a predominant focus on ocean iron fertilisation, to evaluate 
  
6 Timothy M. Lenton and Naomi E. Vaughan “A Review of Climate Geoengineering Proposals” (2011) 109 
Climatic Change at 755. 
7 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 10 December 1982, 
entered into force 16 November 1994). [UNCLOS]. 
8 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 1046 
UNTS 120 (opened for signature 29 December 1972, entered into force 30 August 1975). 
9 1996 Protocol to the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and 
Other Matter 2006 ATS 11 (opened for signature 7 November 1996, entered into force 24 March 2006). 
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the law’s appropriateness and effectiveness at regulating these practices. This paper is 
structured into 6 main parts. Part 2 describes the climate change problem and the science 
behind climate change before moving on to consider geoengineering practices with a focus 
on ocean iron fertilisation. Part 3 critically evaluates the international law relevant to the 
sea and ocean iron fertilisation to determine its appropriateness and effectiveness at 
proscribing this conduct. Part 4 examines two projects involving ocean iron fertilisation to 
analyse and explore the efficacy of the relevant law at the international and domestic level. 
Part 5 considers some options available that may assist in strengthening the law relating to 
ocean iron fertilisation. Part 6 delivers the conclusions. 
 
II Problem Domain Description and Context – Climate Change and 
Geoengineering 
  
The legal issues relating to geoengineering governance cannot be fully appreciated without 
first locating the problem and placing it within its context. It is therefore necessary to 
consider the problems that geoengineering purports to address. This in turn requires a 
description of those problems themselves. The following discussion outlines the science 
behind climate change and geoengineering by looking at the various geophysical and 
biological mechanisms involved. It attempts to give a basic overview only and omits much 
of the technical detail. 
A The Science of Climate Change and its Effects 
 
The weather and the climate are two different things. The weather refers to the atmospheric 
conditions at a particular point in time and space and is concerned with key meteorological 
elements such as pressure, humidity and temperature.10 Climate however, is generally 
defined in statistical terms relating to the mean and variability of relevant quantities, such 
  
10 IPCC AR5 Report WG1 at 123. 
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as surface temperature, over time.11 The timescale in climate change refers to decades or 
centuries. 
 
The Earth’s climate system is driven by solar radiation from the Sun. In order for the system 
to be in equilibrium, the incoming solar shortwave radiation (SWR) must be equal to the 
outgoing radiation. Scientists have postulated this to be the case due to the relatively 
consistent surface temperatures over the preceding centuries.12 A portion of the SWR that 
reaches the Earth is reflected back into space by the clouds, gases and the Earth’s surface 
itself. The reflectivity of the Earth is called its albedo. The majority of the incident radiation 
travels through the atmosphere and is absorbed thereby increasing the surface 
temperature.13 The atmospheric temperature is more accurately known as thermal 
radiation. While much of the thermal radiation escapes into space, a portion of the thermal 
radiation emitted from the surface of the Earth is absorbed by atmospheric greenhouse 
gases and clouds.14 The reduction in escaping thermal radiation adds to the incoming solar 
irradiance and causes both the atmosphere and the Earth to warm. 
 
Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the main greenhouse gas. The atmospheric concentration of CO2 
has increased dramatically in the last one hundred years from a pre-industrial level of 280 
parts per million (ppm) to current day levels greater than 380 ppm.15 It is widely accepted 
that this is a direct “result of anthropogenic emissions from fossil fuel combustion and 
deforestation.”16 The elevated CO2 concentrations have reduced the flux of outgoing 
radiation emitted into space.17 Studies have supported the theories laid down by geophysics 
  
11 At 123. 
12 At 126. 
13 The Royal Society “Geoengineering the Climate: Science Governance and Uncertainty” (2009) Report at 
2. [Royal Society]. 
14 At 2. 
15 Vaughan and Lenton, above n 6, at 748. 
16 At 748. 
17 At 748. 
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by showing an average increase of about one degree Celsius in the last 130 years18 which 
has led to the IPCC declaring that it is “virtually certain that globally the troposphere has 
warmed since the mid-20th century.”19 Looking to the future, the IPCC concludes that:20 
 
Continued emissions of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and changes in 
components of the climate system. Limiting change will require substantial and 
sustained reductions of greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
The United Nations Secretary-General put it in more direct terms, linking climate change 
and its consequences with the oceans and seas:21 
 
Climate change continues to have a significant impact on the oceans and the lives of 
people that depend on the sea. Observations of increases in global average air and 
ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising global average 
sea levels conclusively indicate that the world is already warming in response to past 
greenhouse gas emissions, and are evidence of a warmer world in the future. 
 
The Secretary-General continued on to identify further effects, some of which have already 
begun to occur, noting that:22 
 
Climate change is already affecting the seasonality of particular biological processes, 
radically altering marine and freshwater food webs, with unpredictable consequences 
for fish production. Differential warming…will affect the intensity, frequency and 
seasonality of climate patterns…and thus impact the stability of marine and freshwater 
resources adapted to or affected by these patterns and events. 
 
Other effects of climate change are well-documented. Water and food insecurity and rising 
sea levels are some of the most discussed effects, yet the impact of climate change reaches 
  
18 IPCC, above n 4, at 5. 
19 At 5. 
20 At 19. 
21 Oceans and the Law of the Sea – Report of the Secretary-General, 63rd sess, Agenda Item 73(a), UN DOC 
A/63/63/Add. 1 (29 August 2008) at [259]. 
22 Oceans and the Law of the Sea – Report of the Secretary-General, 63rd sess, Agenda Item 73(a), UN DOC 
A/63/63/Add. 1 (29 August 2008) at [261]. 
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further than that. Extreme climatic events will increase death tolls amongst the elderly 
through an increase in heatwaves while vector-borne diseases will spread in scope and 
reach.23 Population growth and migration will increase leading to the intensification of 
desirable land areas as people abandon flooded or arid environments.24 This will add to 
already increasing pressure and competition for resources. 
 
Climate change has even been identified by scholars as one of the anticipated maritime 
security challenges facing the world, and indeed coastal states such as Australia and New 
Zealand.25 The potential impact on the marine environment could be substantial “extending 
from the melting of the polar ice caps, resulting in the appearance of open water across the 
Arctic Ocean and significant icebergs throughout the Southern Ocean, to the redistribution 
of some fish stocks as their habitats change.”26 
 
Climate change’s impact on economics is significant. Carbon dioxide emissions are the 
trade-off for cheap energy, and commodities such beef, mutton, dairy and rice cannot be 
produced without emitting another significant greenhouse gas, methane.27 Climate change 
has been referred to as the “mother of all externalities”.28 A multitude of studies, despite 
the use of differing models, all show a significant reduction in gross domestic product 
(GDP) due to climate change. However this is not a globally uniform result, “the emissions 
of greenhouse gases are predominantly from high-income countries while the negative 
  
23 Anthony Costello and others “Managing the Health Effects of Climate Change” (2009) 373 The Lancet at 
1693. 
24 At 1707. 
25 Donald R. Rothwell “Maritime Security in the Twenty-First Century: Contemporary and Anticipate 
Challenges for Australia and New Zealand” in Natalie Klein, Joanna Mossop and Donald R. Rothwell (eds) 
Maritime Security: International Law and Policy Perspectives from Australia and New Zealand (Routledge, 
Oxon, 2010) 242 at 253. 
26 At 253. 
27 Richard S. J. Tol “The Economic Effects of Climate Change” (2009) 23 Journal of Economic Perspectives 
29 at 29. 
28 At 29. 
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effects of climate change are predominantly in low-income countries.”29 Various economic 
aspects of geoengineering and implications for governance will be discussed later on in 
this paper. It is of no real surprise that the complicated and inextricably linked problems 
associated with climate change, place a heavy strain on the law and the legal instruments 
tasked with regulating this contemporary issue. 
 
B What is Geoengineering and why is it Considered? 
 
It is trite to say that the solution to the Earth’s climate change woes is through the abatement 
of greenhouse gases. In a less complex world, this would be the ideal approach. However 
the problem is one of collective action and efforts to reduce greenhouse gas risks have been 
disappointing so far.30 This disappointment has led to a second legitimate category of 
action, that is, the adaptation of society and ecosystems to the developing climate.31 The 
third category of action involves proposals, some of which have already been attempted in 
some form, to “intentionally intervene on massive scales in global physical, chemical and 
biological systems in order to counterbalance climate change.”32 What was once only in 
the realm of science fiction has become a beckoning reality.33 The first and third categories 
of action fit the definition of “mitigation” given by the IPCC as “a human intervention to 
reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases.”34 The second category fits 
the definition of “adaptation” which is defined as the initiatives and measures taken to 
reduce the vulnerability of natural and human systems against actual or expected climate 
  
29 At 36. 
30 Jesse L. Reynolds and Floor Fleurke “Climate Engineering Research: A Precautionary Response to Climate 
Change?” (2013) 2 CCLR 101 at 101. 
31 At 101. 
32 At 101. 
33 See Iain M. Banks The Algebraist (Orbit, UK, 2004). 
34 IPCC, above n 4, at 1458. 
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change events.35 Examples of adaptation initiatives include raising coastal dikes or the 
substitution of temperature-shock resistant plants for sensitive ones.36 
 
There is no single definition of geoengineering that has been agreed upon by the research, 
policy and legal communities. The IPCC has recently broadened its definition stating that 
“geoengineering refers to a broad set of methods and technologies that aim to deliberately 
alter the climate system in order to alleviate the impacts of climate change.”37 
 
Geoengineering may be considered as a legitimate course of action for various reasons. 
Although GDP per capita has doubled over the last 45 years, advances in income and health 
indicators have also been accompanied by a depletion of natural capital and various threats 
to the ecosystem.38 Scholarship has shown that the world has a finite quantity of natural 
capital, and by definition, the source and sink resources required by the world’s economy 
for continual growth are limited so that at certain thresholds, demand would exceed supply 
thereby causing negative social and environmental consequences.39 Affluent nations have 
set consumption benchmarks which others aspire to, “it is the increasing convergence of 
aspirations on high consumption patterns that continue to drive upward movements in 
consumption.”40 The convergence of aspirations and resultant growing consumption has 
led to the breaching of planetary and regional boundaries for climate change, biodiversity 
loss and nitrogen pollution, as well as placing pressure on land use and causing ocean 
acidification.41 
 
  
35 Olivier Boucher and others “Rethinking Climate Engineering Categorization in the Context of Climate 
Change Mitigation and Adaptation” (2013) WIREs Clim Change 2 at 2. 
36 At 2. 
37 IPCC, above n 4, at 1454.  
38 Jules Pretty “The Consumption of a Finite Planet: Well-Being, Convergence, Divergence and the Nascent 
Green Economy” (2013) 55 Environ Resource Econ 475 at 476. 
39 At 476. 
40 At 481. 
41 At 487. 
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One could be forgiven for despairing at this gloomy picture. The evidence shows that both 
aggregate consumption and world population are set to increase. The two challenges then 
are to stabilise emissions and atmospheric conditions and to stabilise them at a low enough 
level to limit severe damage to the ecosystem and human health.42 The United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change43 (UNFCCC) is a multilateral forum designed 
with the specific intent of addressing climate change. Article 2 of the Convention describes 
its ultimate objective whilst recognising the importance of economic development:44 
 
The ultimate object of this Convention…is to achieve…stabilization of greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be 
achieved…to ensure food production is not threatened and to enable economic 
development to proceed in a sustainable manner. 
 
The UNFCCC offers mechanisms that can modify the incentive structures of private and 
public entities, and this can be seen through the workings of the Kyoto Protocol.45 
Commentators characterise the negotiations on climate change under the UNFCCC as 
being increasingly burdened by the gap between the low political will to engage in 
emissions mitigation and the significant mitigation levels required to limit global warming 
to an increase of only two degrees Celsius.46 The prevailing view that has developed is that 
mitigation measures will be insufficient by themselves. The convergence of aspirations and 
growing consumption when coupled with the back-peddling of various States with regard 
to emissions targets manifests itself in the view that geoengineering has become a 
legitimate tool in the portfolio of climate change mitigation options. In short, the argument 
  
42 At 488. 
43 1992 United Nations Framework Convention in Climate Change 1771 UNTS 107 (opened for signature 9 
May 1992, entered into force 21 March 1994). [UNFCCC]; 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change 2303 UNTS 148 (opened for signature 11 December 1997, entered into force 
16 February 2005). 
44 UNFCCC, art 2. 
45 Matthias Honegger and Kushini Sugathapala and Axel Michaelowa “Tackling Climate Change: Where can 
the Generic Framework be Located?”(2013) 2 CCLR 125 at 130. 
46 At 125. 
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can be reduced to the following proposition, in order to keep consuming, and living, we 
must geoengineer. 
1 Operation Popeye and the Environmental Modification Treaty of 1976 
 
In fact pages have already been torn from science fiction and rendered as science fact in 
what is arguably the most prominent use of geoengineering to date. This project, dubbed 
“Operation Popeye” was undertaken by the U.S. Military and involved the deliberate 
seeding of clouds.47 Cloud seeding is a climate technique designed to increase or release 
the water in clouds in circumstances in which it would not naturally fall on its own.48 
Precipitation enhancement usually involves the injection of a seeding substance, such as 
dry ice, which is CO2 in solid form, or silver iodide.49 
 
The covert program began in 1966 with the aim of slowing the delivery of supplies and 
troop movements in Vietnam by extending the monsoon season.50 From 1967 to 1972 the 
U.S. Air Force flew more than 2600 cloud-seeding sorties over Cambodia, Laos and North 
and South Vietnam.51 The practice was eventually revealed to the public in 1971, to 
widespread outrage, while the following scandal became known as the “Watergate of 
weather warfare.”52 
 
In July of 1972 the U.S. renounced the use of climate modification techniques for hostile 
purposes with the U.S. Senate calling for an international agreement prohibiting the use of 
  
47 Virginia Simms “Making the Rain: Cloud Seeding, the Imminent Freshwater Crisis, and International Law” 
(2010) 44 Int’l Law 915 at 935. 
48At 918. 
49 Xueliang Guo and Guoguang Zheng and Dezhen Jin “A Numerical Comparison Study of Cloud Seeding 
by Silver Iodide and Liquid Carbon Dioxide” (2006) 79 Atmospheric Research 183 at 183 – 184. 
50 Simms, above n 47, at 935. 
51 Ty McCormick “Anthropology of an Idea: Geoengineering” (2013) 202 Foreign Policy 28 at 28. 
52 At 28. 
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any environmental or geophysical modification activity as a weapon on war.53 The ensuing 
discussions with the Soviet Union culminated in the creation of the Convention on the 
Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques (ENMOD).54 ENMOD itself is clearly aimed at proscribing conduct by 
establishing limits on the use of the environment as a type of weapon or an instrument of 
military operations.55 The substantive provisions of the Convention make this explicit, with 
Article 1 stating that each State Party:56 
 
…undertakes not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental 
modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the 
means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party. 
 
Article 2 gives the definition of the critical term whereby “environmental modification 
techniques”:57 
 
…refers to any technique for changing – through the deliberate manipulation of natural 
processes – the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, 
lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or outer space. 
 
Although specifically dealing with environmental modification, ENMOD is not an 
instrument that is relevant to geoengineering governance with respect to climate change 
mitigation efforts. ENMOD, in its preamble, does recognise that “scientific and technical 
  
53 United Nations Office at Geneva “Convention in the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) <http://www.unog.ch/enmod>. 
54 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques 1108 UNTS 151 (opened for signature 18 May 1977, entered into force 5 October 1978). 
[ENMOD]. 
55 Rex J. Zedalis “Climate Change and the National Academy of Sciences’ Idea of Geoengineering: One 
American Academic’s Perspective on First Considering the Text of Existing International Agreements” 
(2010) European Energy and Environmental Law Review 18 at 19. 
56 ENMOD, art 1. 
57 ENMOD, art 2. 
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advances may open new possibilities with respect to modification of the environment” and 
that:58 
 
…the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes could 
improve the interrelationship of man and nature and contribute to the preservation and 
improvement of the environment for the benefit of present and future generations… 
 
This language makes it clear that the drafters of the Convention turned their minds to the 
potential, peaceful benefits of geoengineering. The instrument is not entirely silent on non-
military uses. It clearly contemplates peaceful uses that could benefit humankind but also 
implicitly recognises that non-military purposes may also create their own problems. The 
point is reiterated by the language of Article 3(1) which states that:59 
 
The provisions of this Convention shall not hinder the use of environmental 
modification techniques for peaceful purposes and shall be without prejudice to the 
generally recognized principles and applicable rules of international law concerning 
such use. 
 
Thus the language of the Convention makes it clear that there is nothing in the instrument 
that should be seen as exerting force on non-hostile environmental modification. On this 
interpretation and from the perspective of geoengineering, there is nothing in ENMOD that 
expresses a position on the use of peaceful geoengineering for the purposes of climate 
change mitigation, whether in connection with the sea or not. 
 
2 Carbon Dioxide Removal 
 
The Royal Society provides a useful, fairly comprehensive definition of geoengineering, 
for the purposes of this paper, describing it as “the deliberate large-scale intervention in the 
earth’s climate system, in order to moderate global warming”60 and divides geoengineering 
  
58 ENMOD, preamble. 
59 ENMOD, art 3(1). 
60 Royal Society, above n 13, at ix.  
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methods into two basic categories. This definition and categorisation omits some 
geoengineering techniques, but they are beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
The first technique is called Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) and concerns itself with the 
removal of CO2 from the atmosphere.61 Some of the main CDR methods include:62 
 
• Land use management to protect or enhance land carbon sinks; 
• The use of biomass for carbon sequestration as well as a carbon neutral energy 
source; 
• Enhancement of natural weathering processes to remove CO2 from the 
atmosphere; 
• Direct engineered capture of CO2 from ambient air; 
• The enhancement of oceanic uptake of CO2, for example by fertilisation of the 
oceans with naturally scarce nutrients, or by increasing upwelling processes.
  
 
Ocean iron fertilisation is a CDR technique and is the main focus of this paper.   
 
3 Solar Radiation Management 
 
The second broad category of techniques is called Solar Radiation Management (SRM). 63 
These techniques aim to increase the albedo effect of the earth by reflecting a greater 
proportion of the Sun’s irradiance back into space. Some of the main SRM methods 
include:64 
 
• Increasing the surface reflectivity of the planet by brightening human 
structures, planting of crops with high reflectivity, or covering deserts with 
reflective material; 
• Enhancement of marine cloud reflectivity; 
  
61 At ix. 
62 At ix. 
63 At ix. 
64 At x. 
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• Mimicking the effects of volcanic eruptions by injecting sulphate aerosols into 
the lower stratosphere; 
• Placing shields or deflectors in space to reduce the amount of solar energy 
reaching the Earth. 
 
 
Both SRM and CDR techniques aim to mitigate climate change by reducing surface 
temperatures. 
 
C Ocean Iron Fertilisation 
 
Ocean iron fertilisation is a subset of fertilisation techniques, all of which share the same 
broad aim, that is, the removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. The process 
involves the introduction of micro nutrients to increase phytoplankton productivity in 
HNLC areas of the ocean. Phytoplankton absorb CO2 as part of the photosynthesis 
process.65 The phytoplankton eventually die and fall to the bottom of the ocean thereby 
transporting the carbon from the atmosphere and depositing it on the ocean floor for a 
number of years. The introduction of iron is designed to stimulate this process 
 
1 The Potential Benefits of Ocean Iron Fertilisation 
 
Phytoplankton that fulfil this role are participants in a process referred to as a “biological 
carbon pump”.66 The organisms not only transport the carbon to the depths, they may enter 
the food chain by being consumed by other zooplankton. This can in turn lead to an increase 
in species such as krill and other organisms further up the food chain. Bacteria may also 
  
65 Robin Warner “Marine Snow Storms: Assessing the Environmental Risks of Ocean Fertilization” (2009) 
4 CCLR 426 at 427. 
66 James Edward Peterson “Can Algae Save Civilization? A Look at Technology, Law, and Policy Regarding 
Iron Fertilization of the Ocean to Counteract the Greenhouse Effect” (1995) 6 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 
61 at 69. 
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assist in the breakdown of phytoplankton and may increase the transport of carbon to 
deeper water through fecal pellets.67  
 
Clearly the major benefit of ocean iron fertilisation is the mitigation of climate change. 
However in a world of finite resources, the cost of doing so is highly relevant. Early costs 
for iron fertilisation estimate the value to be around $1 billion to transfer two billion tonnes 
of atmospheric carbon to the deep ocean.68 Other models factor in a portfolio of 
geoengineering options which calculate that the net present value of a geoengineering 
programme extended into perpetuity is of the order of $100 billion dollars.69 This pales in 
significance to the estimated cost of future mitigation at $1 trillion.70 Other scholars refer 
to the economics of geoengineering as “incredible” and estimate that the cost of off-setting 
the warming effect of rising greenhouse gas concentrations could cost only $1 billion per 
year by the year 2100.71 The economic benefits appear to be congruous with the overall 
health and ecosystem benefits. 
 
2 The Potential Harms of Ocean Iron Fertilisation 
 
There are a number of significant concerns associated with ocean iron fertilisation, indeed 
manipulation of the environment can produce a visceral reaction in many people. General 
concerns focus on the alteration of the ocean chemistry that is the foundation of important 
biological cycles and ecosystems.72 Research has also shown that iron fertilisation can lead 
  
67 At 71. 
68 At 76. 
69 David G. Victor “On the Regulation of Geoengineering” (2008) 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 
322 at 326. 
70 At 326. 
71 Scott Barrett “The Incredible Economics of Geoengineering” (2008) 39 Environ Resource Econ 45 at 49. 
72 Duncan E.J. Currie and Keteryna Wowk “Climate Change and CO2 in the Oceans and Global Oceans 
Governance (2009) 4 CCLR 387 at 394. 
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to an increased acidification of the ocean at deeper depths.73 This too may have an impact 
on delicate ecosystems. 
 
Economic incentives created by ocean iron fertilisation may exacerbate the potential harms. 
As discussed further on this paper, various market actors seem to be motivated not out of 
altruism, but more in the search of easy profits. Successful CO2 sequestration activities 
may earn significant carbon credits which firms can use to offset their own carbon 
emissions. It is this type of incentive that has been the driver of ‘rogue’ ocean iron 
fertilisation around the world. 
 
D Social and Ethical Implications and the Moral Hazard of Geoengineering 
 
Humans have been intentionally manipulating the environment on a scale for years and 
unintentionally on a large scale in recent times. Anthropogenic interference in the global 
climate is the precise problem that geoengineering attempts to solve.74 The intentionality 
element of large scale geoengineering is what separates it from previous anthropogenic 
interference, and this asymmetry between intended and unintended acts, is clearly observed 
in other areas of the law.75 Geoengineering may be seen as attacking the symptoms rather 
than the source of the problem. It may deflect from the real problem and do nothing to 
challenge the systems of production and consumption that may be considered 
unsustainable.76 Ignoring the social cause of climate change may contribute to a willingness 
to use possibly dangerous mitigation techniques. This is the main problem, the trade-off 
between the potential for disastrous consequences from geoengineering, and the potential 
for disastrous consequences through inaction.  
 
  
73 Warner, above n 65, at 427. 
74 Adam Corner and Nick Pidgeon “Geoengineering the Climate: The Social and Ethical Implications” (2010) 
52 Environment 25 at 28. 
75 At 28. 
76 At 31. 
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The problem may be encapsulated by the moral hazard concept. A moral hazard is the 
tendency for actors to take fewer precaution when they know they are insured.77 Insured, 
in a climate change sense, refers to the mitigation of increased temperatures through 
geoengineering deployment. These endeavours are likely to undermine efforts to mitigate 
climate change, thus geoengineering presents a strong economic, political and 
psychological temptation to defer difficult actions to future generations.78 This moral 
hazard is a concern, especially to those who regard geoengineering practices such as ocean 
iron fertilisation, as being inferior, problematic and temporary options.79 
 
III The Law of the Sea and Ocean Iron Fertilisation – the Current Regulatory 
Regime, Evolution and Analysis 
 
This part looks at the legal instruments and principles relevant to the practice of 
geoengineering, with a particular emphasis on the law of the sea and ocean iron 
fertilisation. It critically analyses the issue of dumping to examine whether ocean iron 
fertilisation activities are able to be brought within the exception to the definitions of 
dumping, thereby exempting such conduct from the purview of the relevant instruments. 
Additionally, it examines the effectiveness and appropriateness of the law at proscribing 
ocean iron fertilisation. 
 
A UNCLOS 
 
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) has been 
described as a constitution for the oceans, and the importance of this instrument on the 
international plane was reflected in the record number of 119 countries who signed it, on 
  
77 Robert H. Frank and Ben S. Bernanke Principles of Economics (2nd ed, McGraw-Hill/Irwin, New York, 
2004) at 316. 
78 Albert C. Lin “Does Geoengineering Present a Moral Hazard?” (2013) 40 Ecology LQ 673 at 711. 
79 At 711. 
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the very first day on which it was opened for signature.80 Although participants in the 
negotiations undoubtedly expected the emergence of new ocean uses in the future, they are 
unlikely to have held ocean iron fertilisation and other geoengineering techniques amongst 
them. 
 
The provisions of the Convention provide the legal framework which informs and 
proscribes State behaviour with respect to conduct at sea. The Convention’s 320 Articles 
and nine Annexes were drafted to cover marine issues comprehensively.81 The international 
law of the sea is bookended by two contrary principles of international law, the principle 
of freedom and the principle of sovereignty.82 The former aims to ensure the freedom of 
use of activities such as fishing and marine scientific research while the latter promotes the 
extension of national jurisdiction into offshore areas and supports the territorialisation of 
the seas.83 The Law of the Sea Convention is given the task of balancing the many 
competing rights and interests that arise out of State conduct involving the oceans.  
 
UNCLOS recognises in its preamble:84 
 
…the desirability of establishing through this Convention, with due regard for the 
sovereignty of all States, a legal order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate 
international communication, and will promote the peaceful uses of the seas and 
oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of their resources, the conservation of 
their living resources, and the study, protection and preservation of the marine 
environment…  
 
Furthermore it also reasserts that areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction are the 
common heritage of mankind.85  
  
80 Tommy T.B. Koh, President of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea “A Constitution 
for the Oceans” (6 and 11 December 1982) Oceans and Law of the Sea <www.un.org>. 
81 Yoshifumi Tanaka The International Law of the Sea (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2012) at 31. 
82 At 16. 
83 At 16 – 17. 
84 UNCLOS, preamble. 
85 UNCLOS, preamble. 
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Part XII of UNCLOS is concerned with the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment. Article 192 provides States with a general obligation providing that “States 
have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment”.86 This provision must 
be read in light of Article 193 which qualifies it to some extent, providing that “States have 
the sovereign right to exploit their natural resources pursuant to their environmental 
policies and in accordance with their duty to protect and preserve the marine 
environment.”87  
 
Article 194 provides for measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine 
environment, both in general and under specific State jurisdiction:88 
 
1. States shall take, individually or jointly as appropriate, all measure consistent with 
this Convention that are necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the 
marine environment from any source, using for this purpose the best practicable means 
at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities, and they shall endeavour to 
harmonize their policies in this connection. 
 
2. States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their 
jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other 
States and their environment, and that pollution arising from incidents or activities 
under their jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond the areas where they 
exercise sovereign rights in accordance with this Convention.   
 
Article 194(1) is of considerable width, it imposes State obligations with regard to pollution 
from any source. Article 194(2) impliedly reinforces and acknowledges that areas beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction are the common heritage of mankind by ensuring that 
pollution does not spread beyond areas where sovereign rights may be exercised, whilst 
also respecting the principles of sovereignty and freedom. 
 
  
86 UNCLOS, art 192. 
87 Article 193. 
88 Article 194. 
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The definition of “pollution of the marine environment” is found in Article 1(4) which 
states:89 
 
(4) “pollution of the marine environment” means the introduction by man, directly or 
indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine environment, including estuaries, 
which results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources 
and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance of marine activities, including 
fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water 
and reduction of amenities; 
 
This definition focuses not on the nature of the substance per se, but rather the potential 
deleterious effects that the introduction of the substance may have.90 Proponents of ocean 
iron fertilisation may contend that their activities do not fall within this definition of 
pollution as those activities do not result nor are likely to result in the deleterious effects 
proscribed.91 One reason for this is that the dire results of ocean iron fertilisation, advanced 
by some, are predicated on worst-case scenarios.92 Moreover, ocean iron fertilisation may 
be beneficial to the ecosystem, particularly in areas such as the Southern Ocean, where 
Antarctic krill forms the food base of Antarctic fauna such as whales, seals and penguins.93 
Scientists have postulated that the ongoing krill decline, which is placing the recovery of 
whale populations in serious jeopardy, may be reverse by larger scale ocean iron 
fertilisation.94 
 
There is no consensus on whether the introduction of iron qualifies as pollution. The Royal 
Society, in its 2009 report, noted that the possible consequences of changing the marine 
  
89 Article 1(4). 
90 David Freestone and Rosemary Rayfuse “Ocean Iron Fertilization and International Law” (2008) 364 Mar 
Ecol Prog Ser 227 at 229. 
91 Randall S. Abate and Andrew B. Greenlee “Sowing Seeds Uncertain: Ocean Iron Fertilization, Climate 
Change, and the International Environmental Law Framework” (2010) 27 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 555 at 574. 
92 V. Smetacek and S. W. A. Naqvi “The Next Generation of Iron Fertilization Experiments in the Southern 
Ocean” (2008) 366 Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A. 3947 at 3954. 
93 At 3961. 
94 At 3961. 
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ecosystem were uncertain due to the complexity of the typical ocean food webs but that 
there “are likely to be unintended and probably deleterious ecological consequences.”95 
Furthermore, advocates of ocean iron fertilisation, pointing to the fact that the same iron 
uptake process occurs naturally96, may argue that their activities do not fall within this 
definition. This argument gains more force particularly when amalgamated with the 
proposition associated with krill decline. Whether the introduction of iron can be regarded 
as pollution may be reduced to a question of scientific viewpoint, which itself is inevitably 
a function of politics.  
 
Article 210 governs pollution by dumping, requiring that:97  
 
1. States shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of 
the marine environment by dumping. 
2. States shall take other measures as may be necessary to prevent, reduce and control 
such pollution. 
… 
4. States, acting especially through competent international organizations or 
diplomatic conference, shall endeavour to establish global and regional rules, 
standards and recommended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and control 
pollution. Such rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures shall be 
re-examined from time to time as necessary. 
… 
6. National laws, regulations and measures shall be no less effective in preventing, 
reducing and controlling such pollution than the global rules and standards. 
 
Article 1 defines dumping as:98 
 
(5) (a) “dumping” means: 
(i) any deliberate disposal of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, 
platforms or other man-made structures at sea; 
… 
  
95 The Royal Society, above n 13, at 17 – 19. 
96 Lenton and Vaughan, above n 6, at 753. 
97 UNCLOS, art 210. 
98 Article 1(5). 
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    (b) “dumping” does not include: 
  … 
             (ii) placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof 
              provided that such placement is not contrary to the aims of this Convention. 
 
The first part of the definition may appear to capture the introduction of iron as it is open 
to consider the iron not as waste but rather as falling within the scope of “any other matter”. 
The term “waste” is not defined in UNCLOS yet an exercise in statutory interpretation 
would conclude that the use of the disjunctive ‘or’ places separate meanings on ‘wastes’ 
and ‘other matter’. In any event, iron would appear to be captured by this provision. It 
could be argued that the term “disposal” is inapplicable to the practice of ocean iron 
fertilisation as the iron is not being disposed of, rather, it is being introduced for other 
purposes. However the real purpose of iron introduction is to produce a phytoplankton 
bloom so as to sequester into the oceans a higher percentage of atmospheric carbon dioxide 
than would otherwise occur naturally.99 The purpose then of ocean iron fertilisation is the 
“deliberate placement into the oceans of excess atmospheric CO2 for the purpose of 
disposing of that CO2.”100 However it is arguable, in countering the above proposition, that 
the second, exclusionary limb of the definition, may allow for the introduction of iron as 
its placement is for purposes other than mere disposal. These purposes may be argued to 
include ocean iron fertilisation conduct and other geoengineering techniques. 
 
The lack of definitional elements around terms such as “waste”, “other matter” or 
“disposal” need not be fatal to the Convention’s ability to regulate ocean iron fertilisation 
activities. As shown in Article 210, parties to UNCLOS are obliged to adopt national laws, 
regulations and other measures to prevent, reduce and control marine pollution by 
dumping, which are no less effective than the global rules and standards. The relevant 
global rules and standards are universally considered to be those adopted under the other 
  
99 Rosemary Rayfuse “Drowning Our Sorrows to Secure a Carbon Free Future? Some International Legal 
Considerations Relating to Sequestering Carbon by Fertilising the Oceans” (2008) 31 UNSW LJ 919 at 924. 
100 At 924. 
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instruments to be considered,101 namely the London Convention.102 Article 210(4) also 
requires States to revisit and re-examine the rules and standards from time to time, therefore 
it follows that the adoption of future protocols, for example the 1996 London Protocol, 
could be regarded as a fulfilment of States’ revision obligations under the Article.103 Hence 
the provisions of other relevant instruments and protocols are imported into UNCLOS and 
must be implemented by States who are party to UNCLOS but not the other instruments. 
Some scholars have considered that not only does UNCLOS delegate the promulgation of 
global rules and standards to other treaties, it also endorses the recently enacted rules and 
standards developed under the Convention of Biological Diversity104 (CBD) and the 
London Protocol which specifically address the issue of ocean iron fertilisation on the high 
seas.105 
 
The above articles are indicative of the broad framework nature of UNCLOS, with 
Contracting Parties being left to flesh out details in other instruments or at the domestic 
level. While UNCLOS may exert general pressure on States wishing to pursue ocean 
fertilisation techniques, it does not provide any specific, substantive guidance on the 
subject. Rather, this is left to the other relevant international instruments which will be 
considered next. 
 
B The 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes 
and Other Matter and the 1996 Protocol to the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 
 
  
101 Louise de La Fayette “The London Convention 1972: Preparing for the Future” (1998) 13 Int’l J. Marine 
& Coastal L. 515 at 516. 
102 London Convention. 
103 de La Fayette, above n 100, at 516. 
104 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity 1760 UNTS 79 (opened for signature 5 June 1992, entered into 
force 29 December 1993). 
105 Abate and Greenlee, “Sowing Seeds Uncertain”, above n 91, at 575 – 576. 
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The 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and 
Other Matter106 (“London Convention”/”The Convention”) and the 1996 Protocol to the 
1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other 
Matter107 (“London Protocol”/”The Protocol”) both contain provisions which attempt to 
regulate and control the deliberate dumping of substances at sea. The London Protocol was 
developed with the intention of replacing the London Convention yet there remain States 
that are signatories of the former only and so the two instruments coexist in parallel.  
 
The legal relationship between the two is not obvious.108 The London Protocol is a modern 
version of the London Convention and is not qualified to be an executive regulation of the 
Convention.109 Article 23 of the Protocol clarifies the relationship between the two, stating 
that the “Protocol will supersede the Convention as between Contracting Parties to the 
Protocol which are also Parties to the Convention.”110 
 
Both the London Convention and the London Protocol contain provisions that require 
Contracting Parties to protect and preserve the marine environment from all sources of 
pollution and where practicable, to eliminate pollution caused by the dumping of wastes or 
other matter. Article 1 of the Convention states that:111 
 
Contracting Parties shall individually and collectively promote the effective control of 
all sources of pollution of the marine environment, and pledge themselves especially 
to take all practicable steps to prevent the pollution of the sea by the dumping of waste 
and other matter that is liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living 
resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with legitimate uses of 
the sea. 
  
106 London Convention. 
107 London Protocol. 
108 Dr. Harald Ginzky “Ocean Fertilization as Climate Change Mitigation Measure – Consideration under 
International Law” (2010) 7 J. Eur. Envtl. & Plan. L. 57 at 63. 
109 At 63. 
110 London Protocol, art 23. 
111 London Convention, art 1. 
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Article 2 of the Protocol, which extends the wording of the respective Article 2 of the 
Convention, provides that:112 
 
Contracting Parties shall individually and collectively protect and preserve the marine 
environment from all sources of pollution and take effective measures, according to 
their scientific, technical and economic capabilities, to prevent, reduce and where 
practicable eliminate pollution caused by dumping or incineration at sea of wastes or 
other matter.  Where appropriate, they shall harmonize their policies in this regard. 
 
Dumping is defined in the Convention and the Protocol as being:113  
 
(a) “Dumping” means: 
 
(i) any deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other matter from vessels, 
aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea; 
… 
(b) “Dumping does not include: 
…   
(ii) placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof, 
provided that such placement is not contrary to the aims of this Convention. 
 
A similar analysis to the definition of dumping under UNCLOS may be applied. The first 
part of the definition would appear to encompass the introduction of iron as it can be 
considered other matter and this matter is undoubtedly being introduced into the ocean.114  
However it can be argued that the matter is not being disposed of, rather it is being 
introduced for a specific purpose that being, the removal of carbon dioxide from the 
atmosphere. This line of reasoning has been outlined by Scott although no final opinion is 
expressed on the point.115 Ginzky follows a similar line of reasoning but turns to the 
  
112 London Protocol, art 2. 
113 London Convention, art 3; London Protocol, art 1. 
114 Karen N. Scott “Regulating Ocean Fertilization under International Law: The Risks” (2013) 2 CCLR 108 
at 112. 
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exemption clause, stating that the term “dumping” does not comprise the input of 
substances if those input substances pursue another purpose other than the mere disposal.116 
On this footing, the exemption clause is only applicable if the matter introduced is not 
contrary to the aims of the Convention or Protocol, a condition which is readily distilled 
from the language used in each instrument.  
 
If this interpretation is accepted, it would seem to open the door to iron fertilisation. If the 
placement can be characterised as being for a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof, 
that is, for the mitigation of climate change through carbon sequestration, it would fall 
outside the definition of dumping and the regulatory regime. It is this exception that is 
being relied upon at present to permit ocean iron fertilisation for legitimate scientific 
purposes.117 The performance of large-scale ocean iron fertilisation for climate change 
mitigation purposes could be characterised as “placement of matter for a purpose other than 
the mere disposal thereof” in which case it would be excluded from the definition of 
dumping and, accordingly, the controls on dumping under the Convention and Protocol.118 
 
However the introduction of iron must still be compatible with the aims of the Convention 
or Protocol. The aims of the instruments can be extracted as being the prevention of 
pollution and dumping that creates human health hazards or that harms marine life and 
living resources.119 Research has indicated that a wide range of undesirable side effects 
may be associated with iron fertilisation.120 Some effects relate to the disruption of marine 
food webs which could have disastrous flow on effects for other organisms and species, 
and more disturbingly may actually result in the warming of the atmosphere and ocean 
surface.121 It is at least tenable that iron fertilisation is in opposition to the aims of the 
London Convention and the London Protocol. Scientific viewpoints will once again be 
  
116 Ginzky, above n 108, at 64. 
117 Scott “Regulating Ocean Fertilization under International Law: The Risks”, above n 114, at 112. 
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brought to bear on the question, with research judiciously selected to support opposing 
positions. It is clear however, that insofar as ocean iron fertilisation potentially or actually 
causes significant marine pollution, it should be declared incompatible with the aims of the 
Convention and Protocol and therefore excluded from the ‘other purpose’ exemption.122 
 
An analysis may also proceed that is independent of the purpose for which the matter was 
introduced. Recalling the definition of “dumping” as meaning “any deliberate disposal of 
wastes or other matter from vessels”,123 ocean fertilisation ostensibly involves the 
deposition of iron into the ocean from vessels.124 Whilst neither the Convention nor the 
Protocol define ‘disposal’, its ordinary meaning indicates deposition for the purpose of 
abandonment, that is, iron deposited during fertilisation is abandoned with no intention of 
recovery.125 This leads to the conclusion that it has effectively been disposed of and 
therefore such conduct cannot take advantage of the ‘other purpose’ exemption. Article 31 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that a “treaty shall be interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty 
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”126 Interpreting ‘disposal’ as 
meaning abandonment with no intention of recovery, is not inconsistent with the Article 
31(1) general rule of interpretation. 
 
Freestone and Rayfuse develop an argument that bypasses the question of compatibility 
with the aims of the Convention and the Protocol.127 They re-examine the purpose of the 
ocean fertilisation and conclude that it is to “draw down carbon dioxide from the 
  
122 Scott at 112. 
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atmosphere for storage in the ocean.”128 They conclude that ocean fertilisation is the 
indirect placement of carbon dioxide for the purpose of disposal.129 This analysis relies on 
the element of causality between the introduction of the iron and the sequestration of the 
carbon dioxide such that the end result constitutes dumping, thereby bringing the activity 
within the scope of the both the Convention and the Protocol. Although a valid argument, 
and certainly an interesting approach to the issue, it is difficult to see it gaining much 
currency. Opponents are likely to latch on to the causality aspect, citing an inherent 
weakness in the argument, inevitably claiming that the link is too tenuous. Additionally, it 
is arguable that the carbon dioxide is not being disposed of but merely stored in the medium 
term, to be released once again through natural processes. Adopting this viewpoint may 
allow the activity to fall outside of the scope of the Convention and the Protocol, or at the 
least, to rebut the indirect placement argument. 
 
Both the London Convention and the London Protocol contain provisions permitting the 
dumping of matter at sea. Article 4 of the Convention requires a Contracting Party to 
prohibit the dumping of wastes, the relevant provisions being as follows:130  
 
1. In accordance with the provisions of this Convention Contracting Parties shall 
prohibit the dumping of any wastes or other matter in whatever form or condition 
except as otherwise specified below: 
 
(a) the dumping of wastes or other matter listed in Annex I is prohibited; 
 
(b) the dumping of wastes or other matter listed in Annex II requires a special permit; 
 
(c) the dumping of all other wastes or matter requires a prior general permit. 
 
However nothing in the “Convention is to be interpreted as preventing a Contracting Party 
from prohibiting, insofar as that Party is concerned, the dumping of wastes or other matter 
  
128 At 229. 
129 At 229. 
130 London Convention, art 4; Annex 1 – 2. 
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not mentioned in Annex 1.”131 Therefore member States are able to apply a narrow 
interpretation and application of the Convention if they wish. Iron is not listed in either 
Annex and is prima facie not covered by the Convention. The Protocol has a reverse 
approach to dumping, prohibiting all waste and other matter, with the exception of those 
listed in Annex 1, which may be considered for dumping, with a permit, while being 
mindful of the objectives and obligations set out in the protocol.132 
 
The closest applicable substance relates to scrap metal. Annex 2B of the Convention 
proscribes “Containers, scrap metal and other bulky wastes liable to sink to the sea bottom 
which may present a serious obstacle to fishing or navigation.”133 The Protocol has a more 
extensive definition but similarly lists, amongst other things, “bulky items primarily 
comprising iron”.134 However the introduction of iron is usually in the form of iron 
phosphate or iron filings and therefore would not be characterised as scrap metal. This 
precludes the granting of a special permit for the type of iron used in ocean iron fertilisation. 
However Annex I of the Convention may allow for the specially permitted dumping of iron 
under the auspices of industrial waste, the definition of which is:135  
 
“Industrial waste” means waste materials generated by manufacturing or processing 
operations and does not apply to: 
… 
(e) uncontaminated inert geological materials the chemical constituents of which are 
unlikely to be released into the marine environment; 
 
The Protocol contains a similar definition, expanding it with the addition of “inorganic”, 
to allow the dumping, by special permit, of “inert, inorganic geological material”.136 Iron 
satisfies admission to the class of materials that are geological, and due to the absence of 
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the carbon atoms and chains found in organic chemistry, is certainly defined as being 
inorganic. Thus the key question of whether iron may be covered by this exclusion, and 
therefore open to being permitted under the Annex, is the definition of “inert”.137 Rayfuse 
et al, state that the iron being introduced into the ocean for iron fertilisation purposes must 
be in a biologically available form so that it can be taken up and used by the 
phytoplankton.138 They conclude that it is difficult to argue that this iron can be classified 
as an inert material, and therefore the prohibition is complete.139 Their conclusion may be 
in accord with those of other scholars, however a more thorough analysis has been 
undertaken by Scott. 
 
The Convention Guidelines require that materials that are classified as inert must be 
essentially chemically unreactive.140 There is no general scientific consensus as to what the 
definition of inert is, some chemists take a strict approach that requires no possibility of a 
chemical reaction, while others assess inertness in a relative sense by focusing on the 
toxicity of the compound or substance.141 This latter definition appears to be supported by 
the literature, which states that:142 
 
…key factors in determining if a proposed material is inert are knowledge of the 
material’s constituents, including any potential contaminants, and what, if any, 
reactions might occur following the material’s exposure to physical, chemical, or 
biological processes in the marine environment. Material that may result in acute or 
chronic toxicity, or in bioaccumulation of any of its constituents, should not be 
considered inert. 
 
Iron is inherently toxic and its introduction to the marine environment in this context is to 
deliberately create a reaction, the phytoplankton bloom, and therefore under these 
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conditions it is highly unlikely that it would be considered as an inert substance.143 It 
follows that the dumping of iron for the purposes of climate change mitigation through 
ocean iron fertilisation, would not be an activity for which a permit could be granted under 
either the London Convention or the London Protocol by virtue of its inertness. 
 
The preceding analysis converges to the central issue of ocean iron fertilisation under the 
Convention and the Protocol. That is “whether it is exempt from the ban on dumping by 
virtue of the operation of the exception to the definition of dumping found…in the London 
Convention and the London Protocol.”144 Unless the introduction of iron into the marine 
environment for climate change mitigation purposes can be categorised as placement for 
purposes other than disposal, then that introduction would appear to be prohibited by, and 
in violation of the London Protocol.145 Similarly for the Convention, ocean fertilisation 
activities may not be prohibited if they can be categorised as placement for purposes other 
than disposal. Recalling Article 4, which does the substantive work regarding prohibition, 
iron is not specifically listed in Annex 1 and so escapes prohibition on those grounds unless 
it may be considered as inert industrial waste. However the discussion above concluded 
that this would be unlikely. Annex 2D lists the substances and materials that may be 
dumped with a special permit which includes “Materials which, though of a non-toxic 
nature, may become harmful due to the quantities in which they are dumped, or which are 
liable to seriously reduce amenities. Therefore it is likely that the quantities of iron 
necessary in a large-scale climate change mitigation project would be such as to render 
them harmful thereby attracting the requirement of a special permit.146 In the case that the 
introduced iron was of an insufficient quantity, this activity would fall outside the scope of 
Annex II and qualify for inclusion in the general permit regime. 
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The next section shall look at the events that led to the introduction of ocean fertilisation 
practices to the relevant bodies, and examine the responses of States to these practices and 
the changes to the law that have occurred as a result. 
 
1 The Introduction of Ocean Iron Fertilisation to the Scientific Group and Consultative 
Meeting of the Parties under the London Convention 
 
Ocean iron fertilisation was first drawn to the attention of the International Maritime 
Organization’s (IMO) Scientific Group under the London Convention, at the 22nd Meeting 
in May 1999. A paper submitted by Greenpeace International, sought to inform the 
Scientific Group of matters concerning the ocean disposal and sequestration of carbon 
dioxide.147 Greenpeace expressed numerous concerns. Some of these doubted the efficacy 
of fertilisation practices and its attendant risks but perhaps the broadest concern was that 
“the current pace of discussions and developments in the field of ocean disposal of CO2 
threatens to overtake consideration of the environmental, legal and ethical implications of 
such practices.”148 
 
The report of the 22nd Meeting of the Scientific Group did not specifically address ocean 
fertilisation directly, as a means of carbon dioxide removal but did refer to the Greenpeace 
submission.149 The report acknowledged the concept and rationale underlying CO2 disposal 
at sea and highlighted concerns surrounding effectiveness and environmental impact.150 
However the Group chose not to express an opinion on iron fertilisation in spite of the 
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explicit examples contained in the Greenpeace report, preferring instead to conclude 
that:151 
 
Within the context of the London Convention 1972, fossil fuel derived CO2 is 
industrial waste and, as a result, the dumping of such CO2 from ships or platforms at 
sea or disposal into the sea floor was illegal. As such, the issue required urgent 
attention by the Consultative Meeting. 
 
The 21st Consultative Meeting of Contracting Parties to the London Convention convened 
in October 1999. Among the matters for consideration was the issue of ocean disposal and 
sequestration of CO2 that was brought up at the meeting of the Scientific Group. The 
Chairman of the Consultative Meeting “noted that there was no consensus on whether or 
not ocean disposal of CO2 from fossil fuelled power production would be considered an 
industrial waste”152 but did not approach the topic of ocean fertilisation. The Chairman 
concluded that the Scientific Group should continue to monitor the developing research in 
this field and that the Consultative Meeting “would consider the legal, political and 
institutional dimensions of a potential proposal to amend the Convention or the 1996 
Protocol at a later stage.”153 
 
Consideration of these dimensions became necessary in 2007 when the Planktos 
Corporation, and it’s then CEO Russ George, announced plans to conduct iron fertilisation 
experiments.154  The US domiciled company revealed plans to dump around 100 tonnes of 
iron particulate matter, from the Weatherbird II, A U.S.-flagged vessel, into the Pacific 
Ocean off the coast of the Galapagos Islands, in order to trigger a phytoplankton bloom. 
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This dumping was significantly larger than the small-scale scientific experiments that had 
been conducted up until that date. The 30th Meeting of the Scientific Group of the London 
Convention was held in June 2007 and directly addressed the proposal. Submissions were 
received from interested groups including the United States and Greenpeace, conveying 
concerns about the activities of Planktos. The United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) contacted Planktos seeking additional information about its activities. 
Through its discussions, the EPA discovered that a primary goal of this project was to 
“assess whether the large-scale iron additions result in carbon sequestration that can be 
quantified, verified, and sold in the global carbon credit market, particularly in the 
European Union.”155 
 
The EPA was of the opinion that this project would potentially be subject to the United 
States’ Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA or the “Ocean Dumping 
Act”), the US legislation that implements the London Convention on ocean dumping, due 
to the involvement of a United States’ flagged vessel, and would therefore be required to 
obtain the requisite permits under the Act.156 The response from a Planktos representative 
was to declare their intention of using a non-U.S. flagged vessel to avoid being subject to 
U.S. jurisdiction through the Ocean Dumping Act.157 The EPA expressed further concerns 
over the lack of any information relating to an environmental impact assessment by the 
company or any other regulatory body. The United States invited any State that had 
appropriate jurisdiction, to evaluate the iron fertilisation projects proposed by Planktos.158 
Furthermore, and tellingly, the United States saw it fit to note that dumping, under the 
London Convention, does not include the placement of matter for a purpose other than the 
mere disposal thereof, provided that it is not contrary to the aims of the Convention.159 This 
  
155 United States Planktos, Inc., Large-scale Ocean Iron Addition Projects, Submission to the Scientific 
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2007) at 1. 
156 At 2. 
157 At 2. 
158 At 2. 
159 At 2. 
 39 
 
statement, although couched in fairly innocuous language, could be viewed as a recognition 
of the ambiguity present in the law regarding geoengineering techniques such as iron 
fertilisation. 
 
The Scientific Group recognised that the large-scale fertilisation of the ocean with micro-
nutrients was gaining significant commercial interest. The Group adopted the position that 
the current state of knowledge regarding the effectiveness of ocean fertilisation and its 
impact on the environment was “insufficient to justify large-scale operations”.160 The 
Group did acknowledge work undertaken by the IPCC which stated that iron fertilisation 
could become a potential strategy for the removal of atmospheric carbon dioxide, while 
stressing their conclusion that it firstly remained largely speculative and secondly that the 
environmental side effects where largely unassessed.161 Due to the possible negative impact 
on the marine environment and indeed upon human health, the Scientific Group 
recommended that any operations of this nature be evaluated carefully so as not to 
contravene the aims of the London Convention and Protocol.162 
 
2 The 2007 “Statement of Concern” 
 
The meeting culminated in the release of a “Statement of Concern” concerning the use of 
fertilisation techniques to sequester carbon dioxide. The statement echoed concerns 
showed at the meeting by the Scientific Group and the IPCC regarding environmental 
impacts and requested action from the next Consultative Meeting of Contracting Parties to 
  
160 Report of the Thirtieth Meeting of the Scientific Group of the London Convention and the First Meeting 
of the Scientific Group of the London Protocol, Scientific Group of the London Convention – 30th Meeting 
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the London Convention to “consider the issue of large-scale ocean fertilization operations 
with a view to ensuring adequate regulation of such operations.”163 
 
Three main conclusions were delivered in November 2007, at the 29th Consultative 
Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention, which would go on to inform further 
developments in the area of ocean iron fertilisation. Firstly, the Parties endorsed the 
“Statement of Concern” issued by the Scientific Group.164 Secondly, and importantly for 
legal implications, they agreed that the “scope of the work of the London Convention and 
Protocol included ocean fertilization, as well as iron fertilization, and that these agreements 
were competent to address this issue in view of their general objective to protect and 
preserve the marine environment”.165 For clarity, the competency of the agreements 
mentioned here refers to the London Convention and London Protocol. Member States 
expressed concerns that the global focus should be on reducing CO2 emissions at source 
instead of pursuing potentially dangerous interim sequestration solutions.166 The Meeting 
reflected these concerns by urging States to use the utmost caution when considering 
proposals for large-scale ocean fertilization, while also expressing the view that such large-
scale operations were not currently justified given the present state of knowledge regarding 
ocean fertilization.167 The Legal Intersessional Correspondence Group (LICG) was 
established and given the task of reporting on the legal issues relevant to ocean fertilisation. 
The report produced consisted of the results of a questionnaire sent to various Contracting 
Parties. The questionnaire had invited views on a number of different scenarios. 
Importantly, Scenario 1 asked Members to consider ocean fertilisation with the addition of 
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an iron micro-nutrient.168 The respondent’s resulting views were divergent,169 reflecting 
the differing approaches, arguments and interpretations that could be made on the matter. 
This reinforced the issue of uncertainty in the law and helped to illustrate the concerns that 
were being addressed. Some respondents considered that the activity could fall within the 
placement exception when there were likely to be purposes, such as climate change 
mitigation or other commercial reasons such as fisheries enhancement, that were for 
purposes other than mere disposal.170 However other respondents considered that it had the 
potential to create hazards to human health and to harm living resources and marine life171 
in defiance of the wording of Article 1 of the Convention, and as a result would be contrary 
to the aims of the Convention.172 
C The 2008 and 2010 Resolutions 
 
In 2008 at the Thirtieth Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the London Convention 
(Third Meeting of the London Protocol) a resolution specifically dealing with the issue of 
ocean fertilisation was passed.173 The resolution explicitly included ocean fertilisation 
within the scope of the London Convention and Protocol and placed a moratorium on 
activities other than scientific research.174 Moreover the resolution declared that these other 
activities should be considered as contrary to the aims of the Convention and the Protocol, 
disqualifying them from the exemptions found therein.175 The language adopted by the 
resolution, “ocean fertilization activities other than legitimate scientific research should not 
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be allowed”176 carries a tone of suggestion, compared to the use of “shall” in other 
instruments, which carries the force of imperative.177 The Meeting of Contracting Parties 
also agreed to consider a potentially legally binding resolution or amendment to the London 
Protocol at its next session. The resolution is an example of soft law, and despite its 
language is not legally binding.178 However scholars such as Scott express the view that it 
is a highly persuasive instrument and, moreover, relies on more general principles of 
international environmental law that are independently binding and applicable to all 
states.179 
 
The First Meeting of the London Protocol Intersessional Legal and Related Issues Working 
Group on Ocean Fertilisation in 2009 considered future courses of action and developed a 
set of eight options for further review.180 These were 1. Statement of concern; 2. Simple 
resolution; 3. Simple resolution building upon the LC-LP.1 (2008) resolution; 4. 
Interpretive resolution; 5. Amendment to Annex 1 of the London Protocol; 6. Amendments 
to Annex 1 and the definition of dumping; 7. Amendments to the definition of dumping 
and exclusions for dumping; 8. New stand-alone article in the Protocol on ocean 
fertilisation.181 
 
A submission produced by Australia and New Zealand at the Thirty First Consultative 
Meeting expressed the shared concern that until a legally binding agreement is reached by 
the Contracting Parties, there is uncertainty of application of the London Convention and 
Protocol with respect to ocean fertilisation activities.182 They considered that a legally 
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binding regime was not only advantageous for certainty but that it would provide for 
effective implementation, compliance, monitoring, enforcement and reporting.183 The 
submission canvassed the eight options ruling out the first four due to their non-binding 
nature. Options 6, 7 and 8 were criticised mainly for temporal reasons, both countries 
highlighting that the pursuit of these options could involve a process that took many 
years.184 Option 5, amendment of Annex 1 to the London Protocol, was promoted as the 
best approach due to being the simplest, most expedient, transparent and effective way of 
regulating legitimate scientific research involving ocean fertilisation.185 
 
Australia and New Zealand proposed an amendment to Annex 1 which added a new 
subparagraph to the annex that enumerated permitted substances adding “material or 
substances for which the principal intention is ocean fertilization for legitimate scientific 
research.”186 They noted that the ‘placement for a purpose other than’ exception was not 
defined in either the Protocol of Convention and advocated for this language to be 
interpreted as narrowly as possible but also stressed the importance for Contracting Parties 
to agree in the adopting resolution, that ocean fertilisation will be considered as dumping 
and therefore the safe harbour of the exemption limb will be unavailable under either 
instrument.187 This categorisation is a departure from the structure of the Protocol insofar 
as it speaks of a permitted activity as opposed to a permitted substance. The Second 
Meeting of the Intersessional Working Group noted further concerns surrounding the 
circumstances when scientific research can legally be regarded as dumping.188 
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A further resolution was made in 2010 which reaffirmed the disqualification of ocean 
fertilisation activities from the exemption clause and adopted the Assessment Framework 
for Scientific Research Involving Ocean Fertilization.189 However the amendments 
proposed by Australia and New Zealand were not adopted so that the 2010 resolution left 
the concerns around the legally binding nature of the resolution unresolved. Annex 6 of the 
resolution describes a fairly detailed framework that follows a precautionary approach and 
requires the performance of an environmental impact assessment covering areas such as 
exposure and effects assessments and risk characterisation and management. The 2010 
resolution builds on the 2008 resolution but “nevertheless is not in and of itself binding, 
and it remains to be seen how the Assessment Framework will be implemented by parties 
with respect to individual proposed activities.”190 Despite the legal status of the resolutions, 
States have demonstrated a general willingness and intention to comply with them.191 The 
non-binding nature of Resolution LC-LP.1 (2008) and Resolution LC-LP.2 (2010) has a 
further consequence on the law in that they cannot be considered as standards for the 
purpose of informing Article 210(6) of UNCLOS.192 The consequence of this is that the 
substantive or procedural elements may not be brought to bear on upon States who are only 
a party to UNCLOS and not the London Convention nor Protocol. 
 
1 Hard Law and Soft Law – the Relevance of the 2008 and 2010 Resolutions 
 
Perhaps the most common, or at least the most well-known principal source of international 
law is the treaty. Treaties create legal obligations, or general norms framed as legal 
propositions, to govern the conduct of the parties and are binding on those parties.193 
  
189 Resolution LC-LP.2 (2010) on the Assessment Framework for Scientific Research Involving Ocean 
Fertilization (adopted 14 October 2010). 
190 Scott “International Law in the Anthropocene”, above n 140, at 351. 
191 Scott “Regulating Ocean Fertilization under International Law: The Risks”, above n 114, at 111. 
192 At 113. 
193 James Crawford Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th ed, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2012) at 31. 
 45 
 
Treaties strengthen the force of law between States194 and in some instances, for example 
the beginnings of UNCLOS, 195 are the codification of customary law. Non-binding 
instruments, such as resolutions, are sometimes referred to as soft law. International 
instruments can be analysed by a framework proposed by Abbot et al, which identifies 
three main elements, precision, obligation, and delegation, all of which help to identify and 
analyse hard and soft law.196 International law can be placed on a continuum. At one end 
are precise, legally binding treaties which oblige state behaviour through delegated 
enforcement bodies, or so called hard law, and at the other are non-binding, imprecise, non-
enforced soft law at the other. 
 
As seen above, scholars have considered the 2008 and 2010 Resolutions to be non-binding. 
Furthermore, the discussions of the Contracting Parties have shown that there is 
considerable concern over the precision element of the Resolutions and some of the 
proposed amendments, such as the one submitted by Australia and New Zealand. However 
the dispute resolution mechanisms in Article 16 of the London Protocol provide States with 
the option of using the Arbitral Procedure or choose to submit themselves to one of the 
procedures in Article 287 of UNCLOS.197 Nevertheless if the dispute relates to Article 3.1 
or 3.2 of the Protocol, consent will still be required before the dispute may be settled by 
the Arbitral Procedure.198 Delegated enforcement does exist under the Protocol but the lack 
of presence in the binding element manifests in the Resolutions being considered as soft 
law under the above framework. 
 
Non-binding or soft instruments are not altogether impotent on the international plane and 
can in fact serve many important functions. Non-binding instruments may perform a 
precursory function in that they act as precursors to the emergence of customary or treaty 
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law.199 It is unlikely that resolutions relating to ocean iron fertilisation could be considered 
as declaratory of customary law. However the adoption of non-binding instruments is often 
a first step in the development of treaty law.200 The 2008 and 2010 Resolutions act as 
restraint on future discussions and guide State Parties toward an eventual conclusion or at 
least a convergence. Resolutions also do not require ratification and so are more expedient 
when compared with harder instruments such as treaties. This may help norms to evolve 
faster. They may act as catalysts for treaty making behaviour since once States realise that 
a proposed system is feasible, the move towards harder law usually requires a reduced 
amount of political will.201 
 
Nonbinding instruments also provide a supplementary function, where the law is 
insufficiently precise, by providing concretisations or guidance for interpretation.202 The 
2008 and 2010 Resolutions could be considered as offering a guidance function in the 
interpretation of the London Protocol, by confirming that the scope of the Protocol clearly 
covers ocean iron fertilisation and limits conduct to small-scale scientific research only. 
This proposition may be strengthened by further considerations of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties. The relevant Article provides:203 
 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty or the application of its provisions; 
 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
  
Both the 2008 and 2010 Resolutions may be considered as agreements between the parties. 
The language of the 2008 Resolution is rather clear in its attempt to define the scope of the 
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activity that is prohibited under the Protocol. Firstly it defines ocean fertilisation as “any 
activity undertaken by humans with the principle intention of stimulating primary 
productivity in the oceans.”204 Secondly, it brings these activities under the Protocol205 and 
thirdly, declares that only legitimate scientific research should be regarded as placement of 
matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof.206 The 2008 Resolution does not 
explicitly say in satisfaction of the Vienna Convention “the Parties interpret the Protocol 
as…” but must at least be taken as providing an implicit interpretation. If this analysis is 
correct, the 2008 and 2010 Resolutions themselves may not necessarily be binding 
instruments, nevertheless their interpretive effect on the London Protocol may assist in 
increasing the weight of the binding element under the Abbott et al framework, therefore 
shifting it further along the spectrum towards hard law. The cumulative effect of this may 
be to aggregate the London Protocol with the 2008 and 2010 Resolutions to form a binding 
instrument. 
 
This alternative analysis is still peppered with uncertainty, the same kind of uncertainty 
that led to the submission by Australia and New Zealand, seeking an unequivocal, binding 
change to the Protocol. Option 4, the Interpretive Resolution, was itself concerned with 
making an agreed interpretation under Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention.207 
Although this option was not seen as being strong enough by Australia and New Zealand, 
it would at least remove the need for the preceding analysis, leaving the admissibility and 
applicability of the Resolutions, under Article 31(3)(a), in no doubt. As it stands, the point 
is still arguable. 
 
The precautionary principle has only been treated peripherally in the previous discussion. 
This principle will now be examined to explore its relationship with the CBD and to see 
how it informs the legal framework. 
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D The Precautionary Principle and the Convention on Biological Diversity 
 
It is not certain whether the precautionary principle comprises customary international law 
or whether UNCLOS must be interpreted to reflect a precautionary approach.208 Although 
treaty interpretation may take into account developments in customary international law, 
an interpretation must not conflict with the intentions and expectations of the parties at the 
time of negotiation.209 Despite an application of the principle, iron fertilisation activities 
may still come within the exclusionary part of the definition of ‘dumping’. The 
precautionary principle states that where threats of serious or irreversible damage exist, a 
lack of scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.210 For ocean iron fertilisation, this means 
that insufficient scientific certainty relating to the possible environmental harm from the 
conduct, cannot be used as a factor pointing towards the permissible use of that conduct. 
 
One of the main distinguishing features between the London Convention and the London 
Protocol is that the latter is founded on the precautionary principle. Article 3 of the London 
Protocol requires Contracting Parties to apply a precautionary approach to environmental 
protection from dumping and to take preventative measures where the introduction is likely 
to cause harm even where there is no conclusive evidence to prove a causal relationship.211 
Australia and New Zealand considered the Protocol to be a framework that is 
precautionary, yet flexible in that it allows for the regulation of activities that were 
unforeseen by the Contracting Parties at the time of adoption, whilst ensuring precautionary 
protection of the marine environment.212 The drafters of the Protocol saw it fit to 
specifically include the principle, presumably to avoid any doubt associated with its 
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application as customary international law. Iron fertilisation activities may be influenced 
by the principle but may still fall outside the exclusionary part of the definition as discussed 
above. The principle itself is not expressly contained in UNCLOS.213 However scholars 
have argued that the obligations to prevent pollution are triggered even without the 
existence of a proved causal link between the activity and the harm, so long as that 
environmental harm is likely.214 
 
Decision IX/16 of the 9th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity specifically considered ocean fertilisation and requested Parties and 
urged Governments:215 
 
…in accordance with the precautionary approach, to ensure that ocean fertilization 
activities do not take place until there is an adequate scientific basis on which to justify 
such activities, including assessing associated risks, and a global, transparent and 
effective control and regulatory mechanism is in place for these activities; with the 
exception of small scale scientific research studies within coastal waters. Such studies 
should only be authorized if justified by the need to gather specific scientific data, and 
should also be subject to a thorough prior assessment of the potential impacts of the 
research studies on the marine environment, and be strictly controlled, and not be used 
for generating and selling carbon offsets or any other commercial purposes; 
 
There are several differences between the CBD decision and the London Protocol, in 
general, the former being more restrictive than the later. Experiments must be small scale, 
large scale experiments are not justified, and these experiments must be undertaken within 
coastal waters. A thorough prior assessment is required, which is similar to what is required 
under the London Protocol. Most notably is the requirement that commercial purposes such 
as the generation and selling of carbon offsets is prohibited. No mention of commercial 
prohibitions can be found in the other instruments. 
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E Conclusion on Ocean Iron Fertilisation under the Current Law 
 
The position of ocean iron fertilisation under the instruments analysed is far from crystal 
clear. Recent submissions, such as the one from Australia, Nigeria and the Republic of 
Korea, proposing an amendment of the protocol to effect legally binding regulation of 
ocean fertilisation216 are testament to this. Under UNCLOS, State behaviour may fall 
within the exclusionary limb of “dumping”. Ocean iron fertilisation activities may also be 
allowed under the general permit section under the London Convention or under the 
London Protocol through the exemption limb. However it is arguable that the subsequent 
Resolutions in 2008 and 2010, despite being generally considered as non-binding, may 
assist in the interpretation of the Protocol such that only legitimate scientific experiments 
are permitted. The fact that States have willingly subjected themselves to both Resolutions 
should also carry weight. The CBD also proscribes ocean fertilisation conduct. States who 
are not party to any of these instruments will be subject to obligations under customary 
international law. Customary law contains only general rule relevant to the issue, the most 
important of which is that no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in 
such a manner as to cause injury in or to the territory of another State.217 
 
There is a sense of incompleteness about the London Convention and Protocol. The current 
state appears to be a stopgap where what is needed is a more comprehensive solution. The 
uncertainty in the law allows states to point to the exemption clauses or rely on the non-
binding nature or the Resolutions if they decide that is desirable. The next part will illustrate 
this further, highlighting the difficulty in the application of the law in its present state to 
real world fact patterns. 
 
  
216 Australia, Nigeria and Republic of Korea Regulation of Ocean Fertilization and Other Activities, 
Submission to the Thirty-Fifth Consultative Meeting of Contracting Parties to the London Convention and 
Eighth Meeting of Contracting Parties to the London Protocol, Agenda Item 4, IMO Doc E/LC 35/4 (11 April 
2013). 
217 Tanaka, above n 81, at 260. 
 51 
 
IV Effectiveness of the Law at Regulating Ocean Iron Fertilisation – 
Contemporary Examples 
 
This section will look at the law’s response to instances of ocean iron fertilisation to 
evaluate its efficacy in proscribing this behaviour. It looks at two examples in particular, 
the LOHAFEX experiment and the Haida Salmon Restoration Corporation case. 
 
A  The LOHAFEX Experiment 
 
The LOHAFEX experiment was an ocean iron fertilisation experiment conducted by 
German and Indian scientists from the Alfred Wegener Institut, in the Southern Ocean in 
2009.218 The LOHAFEX scientists submitted their proposal to the German government, 
claiming that the experiment complied with international guidelines provided by the 
London Convention and Protocol and the CBD Decision IX/16.219 To fall within the CBD, 
the practice needed to be “small-scale” and within “coastal waters”.220 The German 
Environmental Ministry based its decision on these requirements and concluded that the 
experiment would not comply with a strict interpretation of CBD Decision IX/16.221 
However under the London Convention and Protocol, ocean iron fertilisation activities 
were permissible as legitimate scientific research. It was on this basis then, recognising the 
disparity between the CBD and the Convention and Protocol, that the German Ministry of 
Research reversed the German Environmental Ministry’s decision and allowed the activity 
to proceed.222 In what may be seen as a small step backwards, the CBD despite expressing 
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strong caution against geoengineering projects, acquiesced to the London Convention and 
London Protocol assessment framework for ocean fertilisation projects.223 
 
On the one hand, the LOHAFEX incident may show the influence that international 
instruments have had on actors. The scientists involved did attempt to bring their activities 
with the scope of the law, although some of their contentions, for example that activities 
taking place in waters that contained coastal plankton species satisfied the “coastal waters” 
criterion under the CBD224, were tenuous at best. The London Convention and Protocol do 
not carry the same restrictive criteria as the CBD and a legal justification for the 
experiments is likely to be successful under these instruments as scientific experiments, 
notwithstanding the lack of guidance over what quantities of iron may or may not cross the 
threshold from legitimate scientific research to illegitimate dumping. 
 
On the other hand, the LOHAFEX incident shows the lack of harmonisation between 
instruments and the results that this can cause. Parties may take advantage of ambiguities 
or incongruities between instruments by forcing themselves through the gaps which were 
once thought to be non-existent among overlapping instruments. Although the CBD 
relaxed its criteria surrounding ocean iron fertilisation experiments, the LOHAFEX 
incident arguably illustrates a successful application of the law under the London 
Convention and Protocol. 
 
B The Haida Salmon Restoration Corporation Case 
 
The main fear amongst ocean iron fertilisation activities is unilateral conduct.  In 2012, the 
Haida Salmon Restoration Corporation (HSRC), an incarnation of former Planktos CEO 
Russ George, dumped 100 tonnes of iron sulphate into the Pacific Ocean off the Canadian 
west coast.225 The scheme was purported to increase the salmon population and to sequester 
  
223 At 179. 
224 Abate and Greenlee, “Sowing Seeds Uncertain”, above n 91, at 586. 
225 Jeff Tollefson “Ocean-fertilization Project off Canada Sparks Furore” 
 53 
 
carbon dioxide through the creation of a phytoplankton bloom.226 HSRC gained 
widespread attention, not only for the iron fertilisation, but for their public statements 
indicating their plan to generate revenue by attempting to sell carbon credits on the 
international market for the carbon dioxide sequestered by the project.227 Environmental 
Canada, the domestic regulator, admitted to being involved in preliminary discussions but 
indicated that no approvals for the activity were sought or granted.228 
 
The issue was addressed by Canada at the 34th Consultative Meeting of the Contracting 
Parties to the London Convention and Seventh Meeting of Contracting Parties to the 
London Protocol.229 In its statement, Canada reaffirmed its agreement with the 2008 and 
2010 Resolutions, in that ocean fertilisation activities other than legitimate scientific 
research should not be allowed.230 Moreover, Canada expressed its agreement that 
activities other than those assessed under the 2010 Assessment Framework, should be 
considered as contrary to the aims of the Convention and Protocol and would not qualify 
for any exemption from the definition of dumping.231 The Government of Canada stressed 
that it did not authorise the activity or receive any details that would have allowed an 
assessment of the project and that an investigation by Environment Canada’s Enforcement 
Branch was underway.232 
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229 Report of the Thirty-Fourth Consultative Meeting and the Seventh Meeting of Contracting Parties, Thirty-
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In 2013 Environment Canada executed a search warrant on HSRC offices and seized a 
number of documents with HSRC filing suit for their return.233 No case has been heard on 
the substantive dumping allegations however the decision in Haida Salmon Restoration 
Corp v Canada (Environment Canada)234 relating to an application by HSRC to have the 
search warrant for its premises set aside, provides some insight into the issues that the Court 
will have to tackle at a later stage and how Canada’s domestic legislation may operate. The 
Canadian Environmental Protection Act 1999235 (CEPA) is the instrument responsible for 
the domestic implementation of the London Convention and Protocol in Canada.236 
 
The core issue in the case was whether or not the search warrant was based on an offence 
known to Canadian law,237 which required the Court to examine whether the introduction 
of the iron was contrary to Canadian law, in particular CEPA. Voith J held that CEPA was 
applicable insofar as the ship was loaded in Canada and was a Canadian ship, and that the 
provisions applied to HSRC irrespective of whether the disposal occurred within or outside 
of waters under the jurisdiction of any state.238 Voith J went on to state the proposition that 
the regime prohibited the disposal of substances at sea without a permit, except for the 
limited exception where that placement is for a purpose other than the mere disposal and 
is not contrary to the aims of the Convention or Protocol.239 
 
Voith J outlined Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, highlighting its effect on treaty 
interpretation and inferred that the 2008 and 2010 Resolutions may be relevant in informing 
the interpretation of the Protocol and Convention yet expressed no final opinion on the 
  
233 Craik and Blackstock and Hubert “Regulating Geoengineering Research through Domestic Environmental 
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matter240 mainly because only the basic elements of the offence at issue had to be made out 
in order to deny the Applicant’s relief.241 The principle of conformity, the rebuttable 
presumption that Canadian legislation is expected to conform with Canada’s international 
law obligations, was also raised with Voith J holding that the 2008 and 2010 Resolutions 
would be relevant to this determination.242 This was one of the points raised by the 
Respondents, namely, that the 2008 and 2010 Resolutions informed the interpretation of 
the obligations contained in CEPA, through an application of the principle of conformity.243 
Voith J also placed some weight on the amount of material disposed of, noting that it was 
an order of magnitude larger than other examples that had constituted legitimate scientific 
research.244 The basic elements of the offence were held to be present and the application 
to set aside the search warrant was dismissed. 
 
The case demonstrates the complexities and uncertainty that exists in the domestic 
application of international instruments in the field of ocean iron fertilisation. No express 
opinion is provided although the case does cover some of the main points of difficulty. 
However, one is left with the impression that a Canadian court may be willing to interpret 
Canada’s international obligations, through the domestic framework in a manner that 
would hold the activities of HSRC in breach of Canadian law. 
 
The LOHAFEX experiment highlights the problems that can arise due to a lack of 
harmonisation between international instruments that address the same behaviour. The 
HSRC project and subsequent litigation in Haida Salmon Restoration Corp v Canada 
(Environment Canada) demonstrates the difficulties in applying the London Convention 
and Protocol as implemented in domestic legislation such as CEPA. It is not entirely clear 
how the 2008 and 2010 Resolutions would inform an interpretation of domestic law in 
fulfilment of international obligations concerning ocean iron fertilisation. In both cases, the 
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aims of the Convention and Protocol may be frustrated, reducing the effectiveness of the 
instruments. On the one hand, through incongruity and the other, lack of clarity and 
certainty. The next section will look at some possible measures that may improve the law 
in the area of ocean iron fertilisation and geoengineering governance in general. 
 
V Measures to Strengthen the Law 
A Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures 
 
Fragmentation is a frequent characteristic of global governance architectures often 
represented by the overall institutional setting in which distinct institutions interact.245 
Environmental law is seen as an example of this with reference being made to the 
multiplicity of global environmental governance.246 The core instrument in international 
law relating to climate change, is the UNFCCC. However this instrument does not cover 
ocean iron fertilisation. The London Convention and Protocol address ocean iron 
fertilisation but due to their limited scope, cannot extend to govern research for most land 
and atmosphere-based geoengineering models.247 An obvious solution may be to attempt 
to incorporate ocean iron fertilisation into a new treaty on geoengineering. However the 
challenges of negotiating a new treaty on geoengineering means that governance is more 
likely to develop through the extension of existing regimes, rather than through the 
adoption of a single comprehensive regime.248 Furthermore, placing geoengineering 
regimes under the umbrella of the UNFCCC is seen as implausible by some scholars since 
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the UNFCCC “is seen as dysfunctional by many countries, and few trust its ability to make 
decisions.”249 
 
However, the fragmentation of global governance architectures can lead to regulatory gaps 
as seen in the incongruity between the CBD and the London Convention and Protocol. 
Australia and New Zealand, in their submission to the 31st Consultative Meeting of the 
Contracting Parties noted the CBD Decision IX/16 and considered that “unequivocal legal 
certainty through an international instrument should be achieved as soon as possible and 
that the London Protocol and Convention provide the appropriate global mechanism.”250 
Conflicting approaches by different treaties to the same geoengineering technique can 
cause regulatory problems but insofar as those treaties are concerned with different 
geoengineering technologies, the potential for conflict may be limited.251 
 
In terms of moving forwards, the foregoing discussion suggests that the best approach to 
ocean iron fertilisation governance would be to continue to focus on the London 
Convention and Protocol. This would save the time and cost of negotiating a new treaty 
and would eliminate issues of harmonisation that may occur when governance of the same 
geoengineering technique is spread across different instruments. 
 
B Option Proposed by Australia and New Zealand 
 
The adoption of the proposal by Australia and New Zealand is a relatively clean option. 
This amendment has the least impact on the instruments as it requires only a minor change 
to the annex and has the advantage of producing a binding instrument for the governance 
of ocean iron fertilisation. Parties will not be subject to the same time and cost concerns 
that would accompany the negotiation of a new instrument. 
  
249 At 550. 
250 Australia and New Zealand Regulating Ocean Fertilization Experiments under the London Protocol and 
Convention, above n 182, at [3]. 
251 Honegger “Tackling Climate Change” at 130. 
 58 
 
 
C Strengthening Domestic Law 
 
International obligations are implemented at the State level through domestic law. It is open 
to a State to amend its domestic law to narrow the scope of permitted activities, for example 
a State may introduce more stringent restrictions on substances that may be dumped in its 
waters or from its flagged vessels. Returning to the HSRC case, the CEPA regime may be 
assessed by the sufficiency of its coverage, the clarity of its rules and the ease by which 
enforcement may proceed.252 Jurisdictionally, the coverage is extensive as the prescriptive 
jurisdiction includes activities on the high seas and in foreign waters undertaken by 
Canadian flagged vessels, while substantively, the coverage is narrow in that it only 
addresses ocean fertilisation,253 although admittedly this is the activity at issue here. The 
Canadian approach is indicative of the high degree of fragmentation occurring in relation 
to geoengineering at the international level, where there is no clear regulatory body.254 
 
Environment Canada has released an information bulletin clarifying its interpretation of 
CEPA in accordance with international obligations, however it has no formal legal form 
under Canadian law and as such is only well suited to those actors who are predisposed to 
comply voluntarily.255 The implications of this can be applied to other States’ domestic 
regulations that are designed to implement the Convention and Protocol. Informal notices 
and statements of interpretation are not of sufficient legal force. To remove doubt and 
increase certainty, these statements need to take the form of formal legal regulations that 
reinforce the content of the 2008 and 2010 Resolutions. This reflects the decentralised 
nature of international law, rather than providing centralised enforcement mechanisms, 
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treaties rely on States to police the activities of actors within their jurisdiction.256 States 
only have to summon the necessary political will in order to effect appropriate changes. 
 
D Economic Considerations 
 
The Legal and Intersessional Correspondence Group on Ocean Fertilization (LICG), in its 
2008 report, highlighted comments made by the CBD that ocean iron fertilisation activities 
must be strictly controlled and not used for generating and selling carbon offsets or any 
other commercial purpose.257 In noting the absence of any reference to commercial 
activities under the London Convention and Protocol, the LICG stressed that “it is 
considered urgent to agree the concept of regulation such that commercially driven 
activities are prohibited.258 Projects such as those contemplated or performed by companies 
such as Planktos and HSRC, may be stifled, if not eliminated, if the economic incentive is 
removed. This would involve placing a blanket prohibition on the creation of carbon credits 
from ocean iron fertilisation activities, therefore increasing the likelihood that only 
legitimate scientific experiments would proceed. These experiments may of course be 
motivated by profit but any future profits will only be derived once the activity has passed 
through appropriate scrutiny. A prohibition on carbon credits derived from iron fertilisation 
will assist in deterring reckless, unilateral activity in pursuit of quick profits. 
 
VI Conclusion 
 
Geoengineering is one of the potential choices in the portfolio of climate change mitigation 
options. Ocean iron fertilisation is only one of the techniques available but has proven to 
be an attractive option due to its relatively low cost. However, the low cost and promise of 
economic riches has led to concerning unilateral conduct. The effects of large scale 
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fertilisation are largely unknown although the potential for catastrophe is significant. The 
current legal framework under UNLCOS and the London Convention and Protocol does 
not provide for clear, certain outcomes regarding the regulation of ocean iron fertilisation 
activities. This paper has argued that although the 2008 and 2010 Resolutions are a step in 
the right direction in terms of forming binding law, they have not gone far enough. The 
certainty that the law requires, in order to promote desirable behaviour, such as legitimate 
scientific experiments, and to proscribe undesirable conduct, is currently absent. Four 
approaches have been suggested that will increase the clarity and certainty of the law. 
Firstly, the regulation of iron ocean fertilisation should be contained within the one 
instrument, the most appropriate being the London Convention and Protocol. Secondly, the 
law may be clarified by adopting the recommendations contained in the submission from 
Australia and New Zealand. Thirdly, States may take the initiative and strengthen their 
domestic legislation. Fourthly, removal of economic incentives via the global carbon 
markets will eliminate speculative, unilateral conduct. 
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